Sophistry 101

Included with the Dodd Frank bill is a provision (Section 953(b)) that requires public companies to include in their annual proxy filings, disclosure of the median compensation of all employees and the ratio of the CEO’s compensation to that median.  This will of course launch more media stories about the inequity of executive pay than Paris’ theft of Helen of Troy launched Greek ships.  But aside from the sheer sport of it all, one has to wonder what practical purpose this rule will serve.

This so-called “Pay Disparity” disclosure was a political fish tossed to elements of organized labor, who for years have quoted a similar statistic (using workplace average employee compensation and average S&P 500 CEO pay) as evidence of the unfairness of executive pay.  Currently, implementation of this disclose is delayed pending the SEC’s publication of suitable rules for computing median employee compensation (expected in the first half of 2012).  The rules are taking a long time to develop because of the overwhelming complexity of the calculations.  Does employee compensation include all benefits – a very significant component of a median employee’s pay?  How do we handle foreign employees or contract workers?  The list of questions goes on and on.

And once we have a number, what does it mean?  Comparisons will vary widely even when you control for industry code and size.  Is Goldman Sachs a good guy because they largely employ highly paid bankers and traders while Bank America is a bad guy because the ratio is higher due to the fact that they also employ highly paid bankers and traders but also has thousands of tellers that staff their retail branches.

Assume for the sake of argument that all comparison and calculation issues were resolved.  What would the envisioned comparison prove – a high executive pay ratio could be a function of executive largesse or it could be a function of a company refusing to outsource its low wage jobs to China.  If the ratio became an important point of comparison, it would create an unintended incentive for executives to invest in either outsourcing or capital/labor substitution to reduce the number of low waged entry level jobs in favor of far fewer skilled jobs.  Don’t you love the “Law of Unintended Consequences”?

I was recently attending an executive compensation disclosure conference where this provision was discussed.  The panelists wisely noted that whether it makes any sense or not, the provision is law and absent a moment of sanity in Washington it will eventually be implemented and we must deal with it.  The question was asked of the audience – “How can we put this number in any kind of meaningful context that will help our shareholders understand it.”  Since the conference structure didn’t allow audience participation, the question was probably designed to spur us to think of novel approaches and I think I have the answer.

Meet Fred Jones.  He is a machinist in Dothan, Alabama and is the median paid employee at XYZ Mega Industries.  I propose that we disclose Fred’s name, picture and a brief bio in the proxy (okay, maybe not the picture).  Then we can include a discussion of the Company’s pay strategy for employees like Fred.  This discussion should describe all of his pay elements, how much overtime he gets, the details of his benefit package, any severance he would be entitled to upon a layoff and the relevant peer companies we used to benchmark his pay and how it stacks up versus those comparisons, just like we do for the CEO.  Maybe even throw in a discussion of his last performance appraisal so that we can relate his pay to performance in a fancy graph.

This would certainly provide context.  Of course, the downside is that the proxy might begin to make War and Peace look like a novella.

I score this one an UGLY.

One of the Best CEO Deals Shareholders Ever Got

Isaacson’s biography has revealed many quirks and flashes of genius that were part of Steve Job’s life.  One element that clearly is in the plus column for Apple investors is the pay package he received as CEO of Apple from September of 1997 when he was named Interim CEO until he resigned in August of 2011.  During this period, Apple’s market capitalization grew almost 100 fold from just under $3 billion to over $300 billion, and for it, Jobs received roughly 0.25% of the gain.  There is a lesson from the Jobs experience that may be of benefit to other compensation committees.

For his services as CEO, Steve was paid the following sums:

  • $1 per year – that comes to $14.
  • In December of 1999, he received a special bonus worth about $90M, consisting of a Gulfstream V jet and a tax gross-up.
  • A restricted stock grant in March of 2003 for 10 million split adjusted shares that cliff vested after 3 years.  On the vesting date, these shares were worth about $65 apiece for a total compensation value of $650 million.  (He surrendered 4,573,553 of these shares for taxes and kept the balance of 5,426,447 shares until his death, when they were worth a little over $2 billion.)

All in, the package came to $740 million by conventional pay measures or just over $50 million a year – a princely sum by almost anyone’s standards.  But when we divide the total by the growth in market capitalization, we find the package cost shareholders about 25 basis points — a “management load” comparable to Vanguard index fund standards – and requiring a whole lot more skill and commitment.  ( In 1995, Larry Ellison reportedly offered Jobs 25% of Apple, if the two of them took it private.)

Of course, by current “best practices” standards, this is a horrible package.  Almost all of the pay was not deductible under section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue code (it was not “performance based”) and there were no pre-established, board approved performance hurdles desired by ISS, Glass-Lewis and TIAA-CREF.  In “best practice” terms, he was paid to simply show up.

The G5 is an issue in itself and the subject of a later post.  But lets look at the big piece – the Restricted Stock grant.   Restricted stock is somewhat of a dirty word in executive compensation.  It’s a “give away” for just staying employed – the last bastion for folks that can’t hit performance targets.  Executive pay critics grudgingly allow that it has some role as a limited retention device to lock in critical talent, compensate a new hire for lost value or as a risk management device where the payment is deferred until the performance is validated (e.g., the whole TARP bonus scenario).

True, the Compensation Committee could have made this look like a best practice plan, attaching a brain-dead performance condition to the grant and preserving the deductibility of the grant under the “Million Dollar Cap” rules, but to their credit they ignored the tax games that so often drive executive pay decisions and focused on the essence of the deal.  Harkening back to the mindset that Steve had when he originally formed the Apple Computer Company partnership with Steve Wozniak and Ron Wayne, they simply granted him “ownership” (or re-granted the ownership he initially had, that was diluted by subsequent capital raises).

Ownership is the true north of executive pay.  Talent that can create real value doesn’t work for paychecks.  They deserve a piece of the action.  How do you set performance conditions for “changing the world”?  You can’t.  Isaacson claims that over the course of Job’s career, he revolutionized six industries: personal computers, animated movies, music, phones, tablet computing and digital publishing.  By the time the Apple Compensation Committee made this restricted stock grant, they had already seen Steve produce two revolutions – in personal computers and animated movies.  In 2003, music looked like a winner too – through the iPod and iTunes.  The odds were good that a third revolution was possible.  They structured the deal rationally by using three-year cliff vesting on the grant.  Jobs was either going to flame-out reasonably quickly or be a stunning success.  The three-year vest got them through that period.

Restricted Stock worked great for Apple.  Is it the right answer for every public company?  Of course it’s not – not every company has the risk profile, talent or desire to produce quantum change.  But when you have a situation where the possible outcomes are binary (success or failure) and performance expectations are a shot in the dark, it makes a lot of sense.  The fact that the tax code doesn’t support this decision is a failing of the mandarins in Washington, not of a Compensation Committee making a reasonable business decision.

I score this as a Good.

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly…

..of Executive Compensation, Performance and Succession.

I am Paul McConnell, an executive compensation consultant for Board Advisory, LLC.  Board Advisory is a firm of seasoned consultants with diverse experience who provide independent and objective advice to Boards of Directors to help them fulfill their fundamental responsibility to select, reward and retain appropriate quality management.

In my more than 30 years of experience in this field, as an adviser and a corporate executive, I have seen more than my share of good, bad and ugly executive compensation practices.  In this blog, I will relate some of those experiences, naming names where appropriate, with the intent of illustrating what makes a good and bad program.

If you enjoy what you read or have something to add, please chime in.  I will allow comments, but reserve the right to edit any that may step over the line.

I’ve been encouraged to get this project going by a neighbor and well known author – Tom Connellan.  If this doesn’t go well, I plan to blame him.  :D

There has been a lot of press coverage recently over the death of Steve Jobs and the phenomenal performance of  Apple during his term as CEO.  Apple is a very interesting company from this blog’s perspective.  It has the rare attribute of simultaneously being an example of good, bad and ugly — albeit more good than the others.